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In his paper "On A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness", Ned
Block claims that the concept of consciousness is best described as a
mongrel concept.1
For Block, the word "consciousness" refers to many different concepts and
phenomena that have been bundled together under the one concept. Block
suggests that we run into problems when we analyse certain aspects of
consciousness using premises that cannot be applied to other aspects of
consciousness. In an effort to clear up the confusion associated with
reasoning about consciousness, Block breaks consciousness down into
several different concepts. In this paper I will be concerned only with what
Block calls access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. These
two concepts appear to constitute his primary distinction and deserve
attention. I will consider David Chalmers' contribution to the issue and will
then outline an alternative view offered by Daniel Dennett.
 
Block's Primary Distinction
Ned Block draws a distinction between two different types of consciousness
- phenomenal and access. This distinction arises from the thought that the
phenomenal properties of consciousness are of a different character to the
cognitive, intentional or functional properties of consciousness. For Block,
the phenomenal properties of consciousness are experiential properties.
These properties are categorized as being properties of phenomenal
consciousness (P-conscious properties). P-conscious states include the
experiential states we have when we see, hear and have pains.
On the other side of the coin, we have what Block refers to as access
consciousness (A-consciousness). This non-phenomenal category of
consciousness encapsulates the tasks involved in cognition, representation
and the control of behavior. A state is A-conscious if it is poised to be
used for the direct rational control of thought and action. The important
point to note here is that for a state to be A-conscious, it is not enough
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point to note here is that for a state to be A-conscious, it is not enough
for that state to be available for use. It must be poised and ready to go.
Block suggests that we may have many representations of facts that are
available for use if somehow re-activated, but their mere availability does
not make them A-conscious. For example, we may have once learned that
the Earth is 93 million miles away from the sun and this fact is available
for use whenever needed. However, this information is not A-conscious
because it is not yet poised for the control of behavior.2
Block believes that A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness usually occur
together but in some cases they may not.
In order to help us acquire a full understanding of the difference between
P-consciousness and A-consciousness, Block provides some examples of A-
consciousness without P-consciousness and of P-consciousness without A-
consciousness. These examples are intended to clear up any confusion we
may have between these two distinct categories of consciousness.
 
'A' without 'P' and 'P' without 'A'
Blindsight is a well documented phenomenon that occurs in people who
have suffered damage to certain areas of their visual cortex. These people
have a blind region in their visual field, and though they are aware of
their blind spot, they cannot see anything that is presented to them in
that area of space. The important feature of blindsight is that although
subjects are unaware of stimuli in their blind spots, they have an uncanny
ability to `guess' as to the location, motion and direction of such stimuli.
In these cases their appears to be some visual awareness without the
phenomenal properties that normally occur with visual awareness. For
Blokc, cases of blindsight point to instances of absent P-consciousness.
Block cannot say, however, that these people have A-consciousness of the
stimuli in their blind region, because the content of the blind region is not
available for the rational control of action. Blindsight patients must be
prompted by an experimenter before they will `take a guess'. It is unlikely
that a hungry blindsight patient would spontaneously reach for a chocolate
in his blind region. But, says Block, imagine a super-blindsighter who had
acquired the ability to guess when to guess about the content of her blind
field. Even though she doesn't see the objects in her blind field, she can
spontaneously offer verbal reports about those objects. Information about
her blind field just spring into her thoughts. A super-blindsighter would be
A-conscious but not P-conscious. Whether there are any super-
blindsighters is an empirical question that has not been answered yet, but
this does not affect Block's point. It is enough for Block that they are
conceptually possible. To emphasize this conceptual possibility, Block
points to evidence that the human visual system is divided into two
separate subsystems - the ventral and dorsal subsystems. In blindsight
there seems to be damage to the ventral system, which Block claims is
closely connected to P-Consciousness.3
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closely connected to P-Consciousness.3
The ventral system is responsible for object recognition and classification,
while the dorsal system is involved in computing spatial features such as
location and motion. Block believes that because the visual system is
comprised of these two visual subsystems, it would also be conceptually
possible to find cases of P-Consciousness without A-Consciousness. This
might occur if someone incurred damage to their dorsal system, while
their ventral system remained intact. Of course, if Block's distinction is
accurate, we would probably not know if someone was P-Conscious of
events in their visual field without being A-Conscious of those events
because a lack of A-Consciousness implies that content is not poised for
the control of behavior. This includes behavior such as making the
statement: "I see a red object."
There are other possibilities of P-Consciousness without A-Consciousness
because, obviously, the P-Conscious / A-Conscious distinction does not
only apply to visual events. The distinction applies to all events involved in
behavior and awareness. As an example of P-Consciousness without A-
Consciousness, Block asks us to imagine a situation that involves the
auditory system. Suppose that you are involved in a conversation with
someone when suddenly you notice the existence of a constant noise that
has been occurring throughout the entire conversation. Perhaps you
suddenly notice the steady ticking of a clock. The sound has been there all
along and you were aware of it all along but you were not consciously
aware of it. According to Block, you were P-Conscious of the noise, but
you were not A-Conscious of it. In other words, even though you were P-
Conscious of the sound of the clock, that information was not poised for
the direct rational control of action until you noticed it. It was at that point
that the noise of the clock had an influence on your behavior and
thoughts. I think that if, at this point in time, you thought back over the
past few minutes, you might realize that you were aware of the ticking
sound all along. The important point is that it took A-Conscious awareness
of the sound to shift your attention to the sound of the clock and to
enable you to even consider that it had been there all along.
 
Assessing Block's Distinction
On the surface, Block's distinction between access and phenomenal
consciousness looks like a useful way of explaining the problem of
consciousness. It allows us to seek cognitivist explanations for behavior
without having to find a way of including the phenomenal properties of
experience in those explanations. Perhaps once we have gained a
complete understanding of how access consciousness works, we could turn
our attention to phenomenal consciousness. I think, however, that in
making the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness,
Block has left us with a more difficult problem. What purpose does P-
Consciousness actually serve? In providing us with the conceptual
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Consciousness actually serve? In providing us with the conceptual
possibility of A-Consciousness without P-Consciousness (the super-
blindsight patient), Block has eliminated the need for P-Consciousness.
The reason for this will become clear in a moment when I look at David
Chalmers view of the distinction.
Chalmers believes that Block's distinction is a very useful tool.4
Chalmers claims that a clear conceptual distinction can be made between
access and phenomenal consciousness when one considers the fact that
we can imagine P-Consciousness without A-Consciousness and A-
Consciousness without P-Consciousness, and the fact that A-Consciousness
can be accounted for by cognitivist explanations while P-Consciousness is
resistant to such explanations. Unlike Block, however, Chalmers believes
that A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness always occur together.
Chalmers also offers an alternative way of describing A-Consciousness by
playing down the role of rationality. Block had defined content as being A-
Conscious if it was poised for the direct rational control of action. For
Chalmers, it is enough to say that content is A-Consciousness if it is
directly available for use in directing behaviors. On Chalmers account, the
case of the background sound of a ticking clock can be described in a
slightly different way. We could say that the information was available all
along but it was not accessed. If we accept this view, it would seem that
there was P-Consciousness and A-Consciousness of the clock noise
throughout the entire event. The phenomenal aspect of the noise was
always present, and at the same time the information was available for
the direction of behavior; it was just not accessed.
Chalmers points out that the problem with making the distinction between
A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness (his modified distinction) is that we
are left with the question as to why the two always seem occur together.
It would seem that there is no role for P-Consciousness to play in the
collective cognitive economy. If Chalmers is right, A-Consciousness is all
that is required for the control of behavior in an organism. This leaves
open the conceptual possibility of zombies and other functional isomorphs
who are identical to us in all respects except that they lack P-
Consciousness. Chalmers concludes that P-Consciousness has no role in
cognitive functioning and that A-Consciousness does all the work. It is
interesting to note that while Chalmers has pointed to this problem, it
does not seem to bother him much. In fact, he seems to embrace it.
"I think it best to accept ... that phenomenal consciousness is distinct
from any physical or functional property, and that it does not need to
have a function to be central to our mental lives." 5
The problem with this statement is that it implies that the phenomenal
aspects of our experience cannot be accounted for by physicalist
explanations of the mind. Pursuing this line of thought would lead us to an
epiphenomenalist position and would leave the question of phenomenal
consciousness largely unanswered. Phenomenal consciousness would be
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consciousness largely unanswered. Phenomenal consciousness would be
described as having no causal function on our mental lives and would
seem to be nothing more than a `bonus' feature of experience. Before we
accept this view of phenomenal consciousness, I think we should explore
other options.
 
Dennett's Alternative
In response to Block's paper, Dennett offers a different solution to the
confusion about the role of consciousness. In his paper "The Path Not
Taken", Dennett agrees that Block is right to locate the source of the
confusion in the apparent difference between phenomenal and access
consciousness. However, Dennett believes that Block runs into trouble
when he attempts to defend his views.
Dennett proposes a different approach to the problem. He admits that his
approach may be counterintuitive, but he believes that his account is a
more direct option. For Dennett, the range of conscious events that Block
categorizes as being P-Conscious and A-Conscious can more accurately be
described under the general headings richness of content and degree of
influence.6
Dennett suggests that while some episodes of mental life have
impoverished contents, others are very rich and are full of content and
information. Block would characterize the rich episodes of mental life as
being instances of P-Consciousness and in cases where Dennett would
suggest that content is impoverished, Block would claim that P-
Consciousness is missing altogether. For example; in the case of
blindsight, Block claims that the subject would have A-Consciousness of
information in their blind region (though this information is limited), but
have no P-Consciousness of objects in that region. This is because
information present in the blind region seems to be poised for the direct
control of action even though there is no accompanying phenomenal
event. On Dennett's account, however, the blindsighter may simply have a
very limited amount of content in the visual field. Because of this limited
content, there is virtually no influence on the subjects behavior. When
subjects are forced to make a guess about the location of a stimuli, they
normally guess correctly. Presumably this is because the content exists
but is very limited. The content of the blind region is not full enough to
act as a cue and spontaneously give rise to behavior, but the content is
rich enough to have a small influence on behavior if the subject is cued or
prompted from an external source. I think that Block could reply to
Dennett by pointing to the existence of two separate visual subsystems.7
As I described above, there is evidence to show that the dorsal subsystem
is responsible for computing basic features of objects, while the ventral
system is involved in higher level activities such as object recognition.
Block believes that the ventral system is closely connected to P-
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Block believes that the ventral system is closely connected to P-
Consciousness, while the dorsal system is related to A-Consciousness. In
blindsight there has been damage to the ventral system. Thus there is A-
Consciousness without P-Consciousness. This is a worthwhile observation,
and the accumulating evidence of these two subsystems must be taken
into account. However, the existence of two distinct visual subsystems
does not necessarily refute Dennett's position. Dennett might argue that
these two subsystems offer nothing more than evidence of modularity in a
unified visual system. Damage to the ventral system merely reduces
content and thus reduces the degree of influence on behavior. If the
patient had instead only suffered damage to the dorsal system, other
behavioral effects might occur. Content would be impoverished and so the
degree of influence on behavior would also be reduced. Perhaps the
patient may be able to describe the shape of an object but not be able to
offer any report on the object's motion.
Although he does not discuss it specifically, I think that Dennett could also
use his account to explain the case of P-Consciousness without A-
Consciousness. Block described this possibility by using the example of a
person who suddenly became aware of the fact that she had been hearing
the sound of a clock ticking for some length of time. For Block, this person
was P-Conscious of the clock but was not A-Conscious of the clock. This is
because the sound of the clock ticking was not poised for the control of
action (until she became aware of it), but it was present in P-
Consciousness because she realized that the sound had been there all
along. I think that Dennett could explain this event by claiming that the
sound of the clock was present and that it could be characterized as being
rich in content. It was not noticed until a specific time because the person
was simply not attending to that content. Perhaps while engaging in
serious conversation, the mental content given rise to from that
conversation was stronger and was influencing her behavior, while the
weaker influences (the clock sound) could not get a chance to influence
her behavior until her attention shifted. In other words, the conversation
had a stronger degree of influence on behavior than the ticking of the
clock. The sound of the clock was not important enough. Moreover,
Jennifer Church suggests that it is not entirely clear that the sound of the
clock had no influence on behaviour. Perhaps while engaged in
conversation the person was speaking louder than she would have if the
noise was not present (perhaps it was a very loud clock).8
If this was the case then we would have to say that the sound of the
clock was guiding behavior.
The main reason for avoiding the distinction that Block makes between
access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is that it only gives
us the scope to explain how access consciousness works. This is because
access consciousness can be isolated as being a cognitive, or
computational type of system. Phenomenal consciousness, on the other
hand, seems to be resistant to our explanatory techniques. If Chalmers is
correct, then phenomenal consciousness may have no causal role to play
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correct, then phenomenal consciousness may have no causal role to play
in the cognitivist's story. I think that before we simply accept that
conclusion, we must consider other possibilities. Dennett's alternate view
seems to me to be a good candidate. As we have seen, we can explain
blindsight and other phenomena in a direct way without appealing to
different types of consciousness. If we can avoid making the distinction
between access and phenomenal consciousness, we may be able to
eventually come up with a complete account of consciousness that does
not leave the apparent existence of phenomenal experience unexplained.
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